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Abstract
This paper studies how expectations of future flood risk in communities within
the U.S. change once they experience a flood. Focusing on small events, I examine if
population and housing values change in a way consistent with higher flood risk. To
do this, I compile a new measure of insured and uninsured losses for 4,147 locations
and identify small flood events at places with different flood history. I show that flood
history determines the extent to which events are anticipated and insured. Flood sur-
prises in communities with high pre-flood growth reduce population and do not affect
house prices. In the rest they cause reduction in prices and no population effect.
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1 Introduction
Flooding has been a serious risk in the US. Flood maps convey risk information and allow
communities to make decisions that minimize losses of life or property. Changes in severity
of weather, local hydrology, and new construction can shift risk beyond the flood zones.1
As of 2011 only 32.5% of the maps “adequately identified the level of flood risk” (OIG,
2017). Furthermore, a FEMA spokesperson pointed out that “anywhere it can rain, it can
flood” (Keller et al, 2017). Places that experience floods will have to determine whether
these are rare events or a change in the underlying risk.2 Distinguishing between the two is
challenging, particularly for places with limited previous exposure. Yet, this is critical since
mistaking higher risk for rare events can lead to significant losses. There is limited evidence
on the impact of flooding on perceived risk and studies of major disasters cannot separately
identify the effect given the large housing and productivity shocks.3
This paper investigates how low-impact flooding can change perceived risk in the commu-
nity. Since expectations are hard to measure, I examine whether flooding in locations with
limited previous exposure generates population and house-value responses consistent with
higher perceived risk. The primary focus is on low-damage events affecting communities
mainly through increases in risk. Two different joint responses are consistent with higher
risk. Residents can buy insurance or elevate their houses to offset the risk. This is equivalent
to an increase in local house prices and can reduce population. Alternatively, if there is an
ample supply of houses prices can fall and limit the population response.
Identifying flood surprises with limited overall impact requires detailed local data on
current and historical damages. This study uses a newly collected information for events
at 4,147 census-designated places covering the entire US from 2003 to 2013. The dataset
1The director emeritus of the Association of State Floodplain Managers, Larry Larson, has stated that
“maps will always be obsolete the day they come out” (Keller et al 2017).
2Rare events in this case refers to the once every 100 or 500 year events implied by the local flood zones.
3An important example here is Hallstrom and Smith (2005) who look at locations that were a “near miss”
from a hurricane and do not suffer damages. They show that house prices decline after the event. Changes
in insurance purchases after floods do not clearly show the effect of risk revisions since relief funding requires
ongoing insurance coverage (see Kousky, 2017).
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includes both insured and uninsured damages during floods as well as historical payouts and
structures destroyed since 1978. This allows to separate affected places by historical expe-
rience. Measuring total losses and their composition further helps distinguish communities
that anticipate floods and have higher level of insurance coverage. I match the flood data
to a panel of annual population from the Census and housing values from Zillow. The panel
setting is critical in identifying the effect of perceived risk separately from a variety of factors
that can affect population and housing pre- and post-flood such as permanent differences
across places, place-specific trends, state-year-specific factors, differential responses due to
the level of uninsured damage, industrial composition, and share of renters. The latter is
critical since places with varying damages and industries likely have different responses.
First, I show that historical damages provide a good measure for perceived risk. I define
historical exposure according to the total buildings destroyed by floods since 1978 as a
fraction of all structures in 2003 relative to the state median. I find that perceived flood risk
is related to this measure – locations with flood exposure have higher footprint in a flood
zone, insurance purchases, and coverage. They get 23% more insurance payouts during a
flood even after controlling for total losses. This implies that previous exposure does not
necessarily make locations safer but simply more insured. Places with low exposure purchase
less insurance and receive more relief funding following floods indicating that these events are
not anticipated. Interestingly, low exposure places border on high exposure ones, suggesting
that surprises constitute floods that extend beyond a high-risk area.
Second, I examine the effect on population and housing by focusing on places flooded
once between 2003 and 2013.4 This allows for an event-study setting with a clear pre and
post period and excludes locations that flood frequently. The latter are not just hit more
often but also experience the most damaging events in the sample. Damage among the
remaining single-flood communities is relatively low: the 95th, 97th, and 98th percentiles
of flood events affect 1%, 1.9%, and 2.9% of the local housing stock. When a community
4Two consecutive floods are classified as a single flood event since a clear pre and post period can be
defined.
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with high historical exposure is subject to such low-impact events perceived risk does not
seem to change. I find no evidence that population or house values are affected. This is
consistent with the higher insurance coverage and with population sorting emphasized by
Bunten and Kahn (2014). Smaller floods seem to not be sufficient to raise risk expectations
in communities with history of damages.
In the case of locations with low historical exposure I find evidence that population
and real estate values respond in a way consistent with increases in flood risk. In a simple
specification, population in the year following the surprise declines by 0.3% relative to a fixed
effect and a linear trend. This effect is persistent and includes a break in the pre-flood trend,
which has a significant compounded long-term impact. With controls for the composition of
the damage and community characteristics the impact is substantially higher: 1.2% initial
drop and 0.6% lower pre-flood trend. A 0.6% decline in the pre-trend amounts to a 3%/6%
lower population in 5/10 years. The fact that the bulk of the response is not on impact but
is realized over time suggests that the initial weather shock has a limited direct effect.
The overall negative effect on population conceals a significant heterogeneity that exists
within locations with surprises. When I condition on pre-flood growth I find that only
attractive locations see a drop in population. It appears that flood surprises limit growing
locations to their pre-flood level. The less attractive communities experience virtually no
change in population relative to their pre-flood fixed effect and linear trend.
At first glance, the results suggest that less attractive locations do not consider low-
impact floods to be informative for future risk. For this to be the case real estate prices
should remain unchanged. The evidence suggests that this is not the case. Real estate
values drop by close to 4%. Adjustments in house values appear to limit population changes
by providing a discount for the additional insurance cost or possibly by locking homeowners
in. I find that the high-tier housing declines the most in value. This suggests that relatively
high-income individuals leave the affected communities.5 Overall, flood surprises affect the
5This results echoes findings by Boustan et al. (2017) and Strobl (2011).
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perceived risk but the existence of ample housing does not lead to population declines –
higher risk is reflected in the house values.
Interestingly, house prices do not decline in the attractive places – only population growth
is affected. This suggests that even low-impact floods result in enough uncertainty to delay
new construction and increase its cost. The model of Capozza and Helsley (1990) makes this
theoretical point. The combination of higher cost of new construction and lower demand
for new housing explains the fact that prices remain unchanged. Alternatively, population-
driven decline in demand for housing may not affect prices if owners of existing houses invest
in substantial home improvement after flooding.6 This is likely to be the case in growing
communities where price is above replacement cost as shown by Gyourko and Saiz (2004).
All together, the results suggest that low-impact floods lead to changes in the commu-
nity consistent with increases in risk. This happens only in locations with limited previous
exposure to losses. Communities with historical flood experience tend to have higher insur-
ance coverage and to not be affected by these low-impact events. The effect of higher risk
is not uniform. When demand for housing is low, existing structures are sold at a discount
that covers the additional cost of living. This is sufficient to maintain the population tra-
jectory. When demand for housing is high, increasing risk delays/increases the cost of new
construction, which drives new movers elsewhere.
The evidence here helps understand how weather events interact with historical exposure
and affect the community in a way not captured by the amount of direct losses. This is
particularly important when evaluating the effect of climate change on different communities.
Climate change will likely cause some significant floods but, more importantly, it will also
change expected risk across a much wider set of places. Locations with flood experience have
a variety of local preventive measures such as zoning, which requires mandatory insurance
coverage. Any new flooding there is in line with expectations and mostly generates insurance
payouts. Communities with little previous exposure will be significantly impacted even when
6Homeowners likely raise existing structures to decrease insurance premiums and do general home im-
provements at the same time.
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the overall losses are limited. Higher perceived risk can reduce the total number of people
that choose to live there or the value of the local real estate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and
contributions. Section 3 explains the institutional details of flood insurance and describes
the data. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 examines the regional heterogeneity.
Section 6 includes extensions and robustness and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
This paper can be placed within several different literatures. First, it is related to the
vast literature on local outcomes, which examines factors that cause the rise and fall of the
economic status of different communities. Within this literature Moretti (2011), Diamond
(2014), and Notowidigdo (2011), among others, use the concept of the spatial labor market
equilibrium and focus on the effect of productivity or amenity shocks on local population,
wages, and house prices. I emphasize the impact of changes in expectations related to
amenities and, therefore, build on insights from Topel (1986). I further show that durable
housing, as originally discussed by Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), is key to understanding why
flood-risk shocks have asymmetric impact across growing and declining locations.
A different set of papers, reviewed by Rosenthal and Ross (2015), more generally study
what causes population and economic differences across communities. Davis (2004), Banzhaf
and Walsh (2008), and Kahn (2000) examine the effect of environmental risks on population
and housing. The former finds compensating declines in real estate values, while the latter
two find a negative association between population and health risk. Albouy et al. (2016)
studies the preference for climate and how climate change will affect welfare across the US.
The paper is also related to the literature on natural disasters. This literature mostly
focuses on the effect of hurricanes at different geographical levels and measures damage in
a variety of ways. The current study also includes hurricanes since they produce signifi-
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cant flood damage. Strobl (2011) uses wind speed as a proxy for damage and finds that
hurricanes lower county GDP by 0.5% and do not change total population but affect its
composition. Deryugina (2017) uses hurricane paths and simulation estimates of damage to
examine the disaster and non-disaster transfers to affected communities as well as the effect
on demographic and economic variables. She finds that population is not affected. Both
papers utilize county-level data and hurricane paths. Boustan et al. (2012, 2017) studies
the impact of disasters historically and over a long period of time and finds negative popu-
lation effects. Bin and Polasky (2004) focus on one county and one hurricane and find price
declines within the flood plane. Hallstrom and Smith (2005) focus on a different county and
show that a “near miss” hurricane still lowers prices in the flood plane. Murphy and Strobl
(2010) find that coastal cities see increases in house values after hurricanes. The current
study extends this literature by unpacking the composite effect of a natural disaster and
focusing on the risk channel. It emphasizes the importance of pre-existing expectations and
the availability of insurance. It shows that underlying factors that affect the attractiveness
of the community interact with risk revisions and determine whether population or house
values are ultimately impacted.
The analysis uses a newly collected granular data that covers the whole country. More
detailed data is critical when studying the impact of natural disasters because, as the current
study shows, communities within counties have markedly different experience with flooding.
This leads to significant differences in preparedness and insurance coverage which ultimately
affects the extent of damages that each community will suffer. One of the benefits of using
hurricane paths or wind gradients, as done in the literature, is that they are not expected
to be correlated with other characteristics of the affected communities. The disadvantage
is that flooding, the main source of losses, is highly localized and we do not know whether
identification comes from places that were directly affected. The panel setting of this study,
instead, makes it possible to account for the differences in the size and trends before the
flood as well as the differential responses depending on local factors.
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This paper is also related to the literature on expectation formation and learning after
rare events. It is close to Gallagher (2014) which examines the change in insurance take
up after flood events. The paper concludes that flood events lead to revisions of perceived
risk which lead to higher insurance purchase that is not very persistent. The evidence is
complementary to my findings since it suggests that living in flooded communities becomes
more expensive.
3 Flooding Dataset and Institutional Details
In order to properly measure the overall impact of an event one needs to account for both
insured and uninsured damage. The existing literature on natural disasters does not utilize
actual recorded damages but generally uses estimates based on disaster declarations across
counties and hurricane paths. Since most of hurricane damage comes from flooding and the
extent of flooding depends on the amount of local construction and geographical characteris-
tics, the amount of actual damage can vary significantly within counties and across hurricane
paths. An important part of the data-building exercise here is to carefully construct an es-
timate of total losses.
Flood insurance in the US is administered by the federal government through the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The program makes insurance available to communities –
cities, towns, townships, counties – that maintain a flood zone map and enforce local building
code. The map delineates Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) with varying degrees of flood
risk. Two general SFHAs are the 100-year and 500-year flood zones, where flood is expected
to occur with certainty every 100/500 years respectively. Importantly, the risk within the
500-year and 100-year SFHA is not uniform – local geographic characteristics will make some
areas more likely to flood. Insurance purchase is mandatory for mortgaged structures within
the 100-year zone but not required otherwise. This is important because risk expectations
rather than local regulation will determine the insurance purchase in that case. Kousky
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(2018) provides an in-depth discussion of the NFIP.
Data Sources
The flooding dataset is based on the NFIP’s insured damage and on the FEMA/Small
Business Administration (SBA) information on uninsured damage. I also use the list of
disaster declarations provided by FEMA in order to identify flood events that generate
insurance payments in a given county-year. The sample covers 38 US states because those
have disaster declarations related to flooding. Data is aggregated at the census-designated
place level (communities for short), which includes 4,147 distinct location with median size
of 34 thousand people. The insured damage is matched to actual disaster declarations which,
in turn, are associated to uninsured damages. 75% of community/year cases feature total
losses based on insured and uninsured damage. All together, total damage in the data has
four components: insured individual/business from NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA
and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured public from FEMA. The main results in
the paper are based on total damage. The components are only used to control for events
where most of the damage comes from one of the source. Finally, I have limited information
on the number of policies and total coverage for a subset of years in the sample. Appendix
A2 has additional information about the data.
Population information comes from the annual US Census estimates for cities and towns.
The geographical detail of this data maps directly into the census-designated place level of
the flood damage data. Locations with less than fifteen thousand people are combined with
the county balance areas to make sure that results are not driven by very small settlements.
Real estate information comes from Zillow and is available at the zip-code level. It provides
estimates of house values separated into three tiers. These are calculated by splitting the
price distribution of all housing into three parts and reporting the middle point of each. Any
zip-code level information is imputed to the level of the community by using census-block-
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based population weight for each zip code.7 The rest of the information used in this paper
comes from the 2000 US Census data at the block-group level.
Definition of Flood Surprise
The paper identifies floods according to the relative size of the damages. Cases where more
than 0.01% of the total real estate value of the community is destroyed constitute a flood
event while the rest are censored. I focus on a wide spectrum of events because relative
damage is context specific – less destructive floods can have significant impact on perceived
risk if they occur in areas with no flood history. I also replicate the main results in the paper
using a cut-off of 0.02% and after dropping locations with damage over 8.66%.
The first panel of Figure ?? shows all communities that flooded between 2003 and 2013.
Flooding appears to be widespread across the country and not only a coastal phenomenon.
In the interior, major floods result from significant rain or snowmelt which causes rivers
and creeks to spill in the surrounding areas. Some of the communities experience repeated
disasters during the sample period. They are separated into a different category since their
event study explicitly includes an interim period and their overall damage is much higher.
We can also see in the summary statistics Table ?? that these locations have much higher
footprint in a flood zone. The second panel of Figure ?? shows single and multiple flood
locations. There are about three times more single than multiple hit places (1,519 vs 542). A
significant portion of the latter are coastal while the former are more uniformly distributed.
I identify flood surprises by using the total number of structures that were completely
destroyed due to flooding between 1978 and 2003. Note that I also have information on
total dollar amounts paid since 1978 but this is not ideal since, without proper historical
discounting, this cannot be compared across locations. The number of buildings completely
lost to flooding, on the other hand, is readily comparable between communities. I further
normalize this number by the total building structures in 2000 and compare to the state
7This is a standard approach and is utilized in Banzhaf and Walsh (2008)
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median across all location that experience a flood. Communities below the median are
considered low-risk. The occurrence of a flood there is assumed to generate a surprise. Using
the median ensures that there are sufficient number of places which can be placed within
each category and that the distinction between high and low surprise is region specific. In an
alternative specification where the surprise category is not state-specific, I assume that high
surprise are only communities with zero lost structures. While this reduces the number of
high-surprise communities it ensures that when floods occur they are not consistent with the
historical experience. The main results do not change substantially with this specification.
The second panel of Figure ?? separates the high/low surprise locations. These tend to
be contiguous, suggesting that flood surprises occur when a flood extends beyond a high-risk
area and into a low-risk one. High-risk areas also tend to be contiguous to multiple-flood
areas, which reinforces the assumption that the former are at a generally higher risk of
flooding. The map also confirms that high/low surprise locations are relatively close and are
part of the same economic area.
Table ?? list summary statistics by the number of floods while Table ?? does this by
categories of communities. Note that, for the case of single floods, the 95th percentile of
relative damage is 1%. The 97th and 98th percentiles are 1.9% and 2.9% correspondingly. This
confirms that the flood shocks have a minimal effect of supply of housing and that any effect
they have should run through risk revisions. Locations that experience significant relative
damage are those with multiple floods in the sample. The number of no-flood and single-flood
places are closely matched (1,771 vs 1,519). This reflects the fact that the sample excludes 12
states and that flooding is a widespread phenomenon. These groups have similar population,
income, growth, and housing values. The no-flood group has a smaller footprint in a flood
zone and less active insurance policies. The single-flood group with low historical flooding
(high surprise) is similar to the no-flood group. The communities with high/low flood surprise
differ on important characteristics driven by their different historical experience. The latter
have higher damage, higher insured damage share, more people in a flood zone, higher
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historical destruction, more insurance policies. These differences emphasize the extent to
which high-surprise locations do not anticipate flooding. Comparing relative damage and
the fraction of population in a flood zone, we can see that the high-surprise communities
likely experience damage outside the flood zone while for the low-surprise communities the
observed damage is within the flood zone. Comparing high-surprise communities by pre-
flood growth reveals that the two groups are similar but for the difference in real estate
values which reflect their attractiveness.
4 Main Results
The historical experience of a community is critical in understanding how floods affect its size
and real estate – only unexpected floods are likely to results in any changes. Even surprises
can be interpreted as rare events and can have no impact, particularly if damages are small.
This section first looks at how insurance coverage and payouts vary with historical exposure
in the cross-section of events. Following that I use the full panel to examine whether flood
surprises lead to changes in size and real estate values consistent with updated flood risk.
To set the stage for the formal results, consider the experience of three communities in
Connecticut: Milford, Bridgeport, and New Haven. All were affected by hurricane Irene in
2011 and Sandy in 2012. Since the events were consecutive they fall in the single-flood group
with no interim period. Milford made it into the local news for the extent of losses and the
fact that no one had the intention to move. It suffered $90 mil in damages (0.5% of real
estate value) while Bridgeport and New Haven suffered $16 mil (0.12%)/$7 mil (0.05%). The
difference in damages implies that Milford should be affected significantly more but its flood
history suggests that the event was not such a surprise. Between 1978 and 2003 Milford
lost 6.2% of its structures due to flooding while Bridgeport and New Haven lost 0.7%/0.5%
respectively. Figure ?? shows the population growth for each of the communities. We
see that the population in Milford was not affected. At the same time the communities
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with smaller overall damage but with relatively low history of floods experienced population
declines. Notice that the communities did not experience a large-scale disaster since damages
were relatively small. Nevertheless, they seem to have changed the expectations about future
flood risk and the attractiveness of the communities with low history.
Flood Surprise and Insurance Payouts
The first set of formal results examines the extent to which historical losses can be used to
identify flood surprises. Regulations require that structures within the 100-year flood zone
carry insurance if they have a federally-backed mortgage. Insurance purchase for any other
structures – wholly owned within the 100-year zone or outside – depend on the perceived
risk of a flood. High flood history can increase perceived risk and lead to insurance purchase.
I examine this relationship by comparing the average insurance payouts across the high- and
low-flood history groups in the cross-section of all events. If flood history does not affect the
extent to which floods are anticipated we should not see differences in insurance coverage
across these groups. I test this relationship by estimating:
ln (Payouts)i = αt + βFi ×Dami + γFi ×Dami × LSurprisei + {MFl}+ i (1)
where Payouts is total insurance payouts per capita after an event at community i and
αt is an year effect. Fi is an indicator for a flood at a single-flood location i, Dami is
total damage per capita, and LSurprisei is an indicator for low surprise flooding (high
flood history). {MFl} abbreviates the same set of indicators for locations with multiple
floods.8 Positive γ implies that the same damage generates more payouts in low surprise
communities. Additionally, I estimate the above model without controlling for damage. In
that case γ represents the additional insurance payouts generated during an average flood
event at communities with history of flooding. Finally, I estimate the model using active
insurance policies for the set of communities where this data is available. Note that the model
8Note that for the single-flood locations i represents both the community and the event whereas for the
multiple-flood locations it represents a particular event at a given community.
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does not include contemporaneous controls. This is because the indicator for low surprise is
determined by the historical experience of the location since 1978 and any contemporaneous
controls will be partially determined by its history. By excluding these controls I estimate
the total effect of location history not the partial one.
Table ?? shows the estimation results. Communities with a low-surprise flood have
significantly higher insurance payouts per capita during an average flood event (model 1).
This is consistent with the higher number of active insurance policies observed. These
locations receive almost double the insurance compensation relative to locations with low
history.
Model 2 of Table ?? explores the regional heterogeneity. High history is associated with
higher insurance payout in all six US regions. Notice that the Mid-Atlantic and South
Atlantic region have higher than national average payouts but even there low surprise com-
munities receive higher amounts. Since this specification does not control for damage, the
low surprise events in those regions likely have more insurance payouts because the events
are generally more damaging.
Model (3) controls for overall damage. 1% increase in total damage leads to 0.43%
increase in insurance payouts at communities with low history of flooding and 0.66% increase
in payouts at high flood history locations. Communities with previous floods have 50%
more of their damage covered through insurance compared to the rest. Note that low flood
communities still have insurance coverage since they also have flood zones. Yet, the coverage
is smaller since their flood zones are not sufficiently big and/or residents choose to not buy
insurance. Model (4) shows that this result is consistent across regions of the US. Models
(5) and (6) show that affected low-surprise locations have more active insurance policies. In
fact, even though the active-policies sample is smaller the difference between the number of
policies and payouts is remarkably similar.
Overall, the results provide further confirmation of the group differences observed in
the summary statistics. They show that more people live in a flood zone in communities
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with high flood experience. The bigger zones are likely a result of the past flood history.
Nevertheless, if communities in both groups anticipate flood events equally we would not
observe differences in the insurance coverage since the low-history communities will choose
to buy insurance outside of the flood zones. The fact that even at the same damage level
low history places have lower insurance coverage suggests that they discount existing risk.
Population Responses
I examine how low-impact weather events interact with historical exposure and affect local
population by estimating an event-study model with location-specific trends and fixed effects
as well as differential responses conditioned on local characteristics. More specifically, I
estimate the following model in several variations:
lnPopist = αi+ti+γst+β1Fit−1+β2PostFit−2+β3PostTrendit−2+δXit−1+{MFlit−1}+ist (2)
Log population for community i within state s in year t is explained by a community aver-
age, αi, community linear trend, ti, and a state-year effect, γst. This specification is flexible
enough to allow for time-invariant differences in settlement size and community-specific dif-
ferences in the population growth.9 Allowing for a community fixed effect implies that any
constant factors that explain why a community is bigger or smaller will not explain popu-
lation responses to floods. Similarly, location-specific linear trends imply that factors that
affect the overall population growth of the community will not explain flood responses. These
responses are identified if each affected community experiences a similar deviation from its
own population average and pre-food growth. It is possible that places with higher uninsured
damage, higher share of renters, and more developed local economy respond differently. I
do allow for this as explained below. Finally, the state-year effect captures variations in
local population which can be traced to the state/national level.10 The Great Recession is
9For a discussion of size and trend-difference see Desmet and Henderson (2014) and Desmet and Rappaport
(2017).
10Blachanrd and Katz (1992) discuss the important differences in population patterns across sates.
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an important factor in the sample which has affected population and can be accommodated
with the state-year controls.
I identify the effect of floods by first separating communities according to the number of
floods they experience. For the single-flood group, I include an indicator for the year after
the flood, Fit−1 , an indicator for the period from the second year onwards, PostFit−2, and a
trend break after the flood, PostTrendit−2. The multiple-flood group includes an indicator
for the period(s) between the floods. β1 represents the contemporaneous effect of the flood
i.e. within the first year; β2 captures the persistence of the initial effect; β3 allows for a change
in the trend relative to the pre-flood one. Xit−1 includes a set of additional indicators that
have been interacted with Fit−1, PostFit−2, and PostTrendit−2. I present evidence with and
without these interactions to emphasize how allowing for differential responses affects the
results. These include indicators based on the state distribution for: top 66th percentile
of FEMA/NFIP/SBA business/SBA homeowners damage shares; bottom 33th percentile
of relative damages; top 50th percentile of share of non-construction occupations; top 50th
percentile of share of renters. The last two indicators are based on the 2000 Census values
and, therefore, are time-invariant. While the fixed effects already control for these differences
I can still identify whether locations with more non-construction workers and more renters
respond differently to flood events. The first controls for two separate effects: availability
of job opportunities outside construction, which is usually over-represented in communities
with less robust local economy; and the general lack of construction workers, which can lead
to the inflow of such workers in order to conduct local repairs. Both of these are expected
to lead to increases in population after a flood. The second controls for the capacity to
accommodate the displaced from floods, as well as emergency or temporary workers. This
can also lead to increases in local population even if the community is hit by a flood. The
control will not be sufficient if these additional workers are placed in temporary housing.
In this case it is important to examine the persistence of the estimated flood impact since
temporary workers will lead to a reversal of the initial impact as they leave.
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The baseline model assumes that flood surprises are not relevant. I extend this by allowing
for different responses across the high/low history communities. Finally, I separate the
impact by pre-flood population growth (last five years). Growing locations attract more new-
comers and experience demand for new housing because of improved labor market or/and
local amenities. Conditioning on pre-growth can reveal how persistent demand for housing
affects the overall response to a flood surprise. It also helps us interpret the trend break
by identifying whether growing or stagnant locations see a change in trajectory. Note that
pre-growth is time varying while the controls for the local economy/renters are not. The
former accounts for higher-frequency shocks while the latter identifies lower-frequency ones
such as an urban status. For example, urban communities with diversified local economies
are not expected to necessarily be growing. For that to happen they need additionally to be
affected by a productivity shock. Although both factors are important the paper emphasizes
the effect of existing positive net migration – a higher-frequency shock – and simply control
for the time-invariant differences.
I also estimate the model using a stricter criterion for the high-surprise category – in-
cluding only locations with no building destruction in the past 25 years. This limits the
number of high-surprise communities but ensures that the occurrence of a flood breaks with
the location’s history. Evidence from this specification can further confirm that results are
driven by changes in expected flood risk.
Table ?? shows the results from the population model. Each of the three versions of the
baseline model includes estimates without/with Xit−1 controls. Population at the average
location in model (1) – which can have high or low history of flooding – is not affected by
a flood. The average location from model (2) with a less diversified economy and lower
availability of rentals, among other controls, sees a 0.92% decline in population in the year
following the event. This decline is persistent and is accompanied by a 0.4% decline in the
pre-flood trajectory. The difference in results comes from the fact that the composition of
the local economy, the availability of rentals, and the share of FEMA-recorded damages each
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soften the flood impact or, in some cases, increase population. While these are important
results on their own the paper focuses on the impact of flood surprises and persistent de-
mand for new housing so they are designated to the set of controls.11 Overall, model (2)
shows that flooded places with lower rental share, higher construction occupations share, and
intermediate damage shares see a decrease in expected population which is persistent and
accompanied by a trend break. Even without accounting for the level of surprise, population
is negatively impacted.
The effect of flood surprises is identified in models (3) and (4). The evidence shows that
population declines are significantly stronger in communities that experience a flood suprise.
An average location from (3) is only affected when the flood is unexpected. On impact,
population drops by 0.3%; the effect is persistent; pre-flood trend declines by 0.15% after
the event. Compared to (1), where floods do not affect population, we see that identifying
surprises is critical. More specifically, we see that floods in locations with limited previous
experience generate a response consistent with increased risk i.e. they are not disregarded
as rare events. This is consistent with the insurance results and suggests that revisions of
flood risk disrupt the pre-flood population dynamic. With controls, flood surprises generate
significantly bigger declines in population: 1.2% decline on impact, 1% in the post period,
and 0.6% decline in pre trend. Low surprise floods also affect population. Interestingly,
the regional results show that this effect is not a nation-wide phenomenon but comes from
the northeastern region. Results from (3) and (4) provide strong evidence that population
declines when a flood is unexpected. While the initial decline in population is persistent it
is still relatively small at 1%. This is consistent with the low impact that these events have
on the housing stock. The trend break represents a much bigger impact on the population
of a community following the event. A 0.6% decline in the pre-trend amounts to a 3%/6%
lower population in 5/10 years. This implies that the effect stems from revisions of risk
11Kahn (2009) points out that urban areas can experience population growth after a flood because the city
infrastructure provides safety. Since urban areas have more diversified economies and higher renter shares,
I implicitly account for this.
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expectations. As a place becomes more risky its population declines over time as either
people leave or potential new-comers go elsewhere. Note that flooding seems to lead to
some population increases in places with more diversified local economies and more rental
capacity. The result is consistent with findings in Boustan et al. (2012), who show that
floods actually increase population. This effect can offset the decline in population from the
increase in riskiness. In the cases of flood surprises the second effect is much stronger and
leads to overall decrease in population.
The evidence so far shows that surprises disrupt the pre-existing population trajectory.
A decline in the linear trend implies a slow down in expansion and stabilizing of population
in a growing location; in a stable or declining place it implies loss of population or an ac-
celeration of such loss. To help interpret the trend break I estimate separately the impact
for locations with positive (constant) and negative growth in the preceding five years. This
also helps understand how a productivity/amenity shock interacts with risk revisions. The
results in (5) and (6) show that the surprise driven population decline occurs primarily in at-
tractive communities with non-negative pre-flood growth. Population drops by 0.55%/1.4%
without/with controls and remains lower in the post period. There is a decline in the pre
trend of 0.4%/0.8%. These communities effectively stop expanding after the flood surprise
and population becomes fixed at its pre-flood level. Locations with declining population are
either not affected (with controls) or see an increase (without controls). The difference in
outcomes suggests that the population decline is related to the demand for new housing or
excess of newcomers. This is consistent with a decrease in the attractiveness of the commu-
nity following a revision of expected flood risk. Importantly, it requires that the real estate
market does not fully compensate the risk increase with a discount that offsets the cost of
insurance. Similarly, the fact that lower growth communities are not affected suggests that
flood events are ignored as rare events or that the real estate values decline and compensate
for higher risk. I explore this question in the next section.
Results in (7) and (8) show that a stricter definition of flood surprise is associated with
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stronger declines in population. They imply that some of the locations with positive historical
destruction likely anticipate future flooding. Yet, given that the estimated coefficients are
similar this is not a big concern. Finally, Table ?? in the online appendix shows that the
results are not changed when I increase the cut-off for a flood event to 0.02%, which is the
25th percentile of the baseline sample as seen in the summary statistics. The results are also
not affected when I drop locations with more than 8.66% of damage, which is the the 95th
percentile of the baseline sample for locations with multiple flood events. These results are
listed in Table ?? in the online appendix.
It is possible that the observed interaction between pre-flood growth and flood surprises
is due to differences in income or local land-use regulation, not in the growth per se. For
example, weak regulation may be driving growth in locations that ultimately see higher
flood risk. Revisions of risk, therefore, may be more impactful where regulation is low.
Alternatively, strong regulation can significantly limit new construction and make the repair
of existing structures very costly. This can lead to higher population impact in highly-
regulated communities. Similar concern exist across communities with different income level.
I explore these alternatives in the robustness section. The evidence generally suggests that
they are not able to explain why population decreases after a risk revision.
It is important to point out an issue that relates to the possible endogeneity of flooding
and an unobservable local economic factor. It is possible that such a factor causes commu-
nities to invest less in flood protection and ultimately causes bigger damages. Here it really
matters how this factor is related to the population trajectory before and after the flood. If
it causes population to be decreasing before the flood then I incorporate this in the model
by allowing location-specific trajectory before the flood. If it cause population to respond
differently only after the flood then it is hard for me to disentangle the effect. I can only
accommodate this possibility by including the set of controls in Xit−1.
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Real Estate Responses
In this part I examine how the housing market responds to surprises and, more specifically,
whether there is evidence of compensating effects by estimating the most restricted version
of the model as in (6) above. Results are listed in Table ?? for each of the three tiers.
There is no evidence that house values, across all three tiers, compensate for the increase
in flood risk at locations with high pre-growth. This result is consistent with the model by
Capozza and Helsley (1990) who show that in the case of expanding communities higher risk
leads to increases in the price and delays of new construction. It suggests that the increase
in flood risk generates a decrease in the supply of new houses. The fact that equilibrium
house prices do not adjust indicates that the community experiences both a decrease in the
demand and supply of new houses. Alternatively, growing communities are likely to have
an incentive to invest in home improvement after expected future risk increases. This is due
to the higher price-to-cost ratio in these communities (Gyourko and Saiz 2004). In other
words, following risk increases, owners can raises their homes and add another floor, among
other improvements, which increases the house value. In either case, local housing becomes
relatively more expensive and new-comers choose other locations, which limits the size of
the community.
In the case of low-growth location the evidence shows a clear decline of house values after a
surprise. Top and middle-tier housing decrease by 2.3%-3.4% on impact; the dip is persistent
and remains 4.4% lower in the post period. Bottom-tier housing does not appear to decrease
on impact although there is evidence of a decline in the post period. The change in real
estate prices suggests that the constant population does not imply that flood surprises are
irrelevant for perceived flood risk. In these communities, low demand for additional housing
leads to higher sensitivity of housing values and lower sensitivity of population. House values
decline and provide a discount that can compensate for the increase in expected flood risk
and the associated costs. This result is similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), and more
recently to Notowidigdo (2011), who point out that negative productivity shocks will not lead
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to population declines but to reduction in local house prices. The fact that more expensive
houses take the brunt of the adjustment indicate that the higher-wealth population likely
leaves the community. This is consistent with findings by Boustan et al. (2017) and Strobl
(2011) who show that high-income individuals leave communities affected by disasters.
All together the housing and population results suggest the following interpretation.
Flooding in places with previous experience does not generate changes in perceived risk and
does not cause changes in population or house values. In contrast, flood surprises drive
upward revisions of the underlying probability of a future flood which in turn raises the
cost of living. In locations where demand for housing is low, existing structures are sold
at a discount that covers the additional cost. This appears to be sufficient to maintain the
existing population trajectory. In location where demand for housing is high, there is both a
decrease in the demand and supply of new housing. This leads house prices unchanged and
reduces long-term population.
Figure ?? shows the evolution of population and real estate for Milford and the two
neighbors and helps us understand the example at the beginning of the section. Milford
has a high history of flooding and the flood events do not constitute surprises. We see that
population and real estate values (top tier) are not affected. New Haven and Bridgeport, on
the other hand, see a decline in population but in line with the results in this section housing
closely follows the trajectory of Milford and does not decline. This puts the two neighbors in
the high-pre-growth group where demand for new housing seems to prevent a compensating
decline that offsets higher risk. The cost increase is consistent with population decline.
5 Regional Results
The main results are based on a national sample which combines locations across various
geographies each with a specific climate and regulatory setting. The econometric specifica-
tion accounts for this heterogeneity with the individual average, trend, and state-year effects
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but we cannot be certain that the identified responses are a general phenomenon occurring
across the country. It is possible that population responds strongly only in one area of the US
with no effect elsewhere. Additionally, since the joint response of population and real estate
help understand the impact of surprises, it is important to confirm that this relationship is
maintained within separate regions. I investigate within-country heterogeneity by allowing
the main coefficients to vary by a Census regions.12
The regional results for population are listed in Table ??. The coefficients reported in
the table are all based on one estimation – different columns show estimates by surprise/pre-
growth group. For example, the coefficients for the high-surprise/high-growth group from
the Mid-Atlantic region is listed in the second column rows 2, 8, and 14. The results confirm
that surprises affect population at high pre-growth communities. Not all regions experience
on impact, post, and trend break effects but all of them feature some combination. This
suggests that the national results identify a general phenomenon where new movers choose
a different destination after risk increases. Notice that the population declines at high pre-
growth/low surprise communities seen in the main results are only identified in the Northeast
region. This cautions against directly interpreting the national results without confirming
that they hold at the regional level.
Regional real estate results for top-tier housing are shown in Table ??. We see no real
estate depreciation in any of the regions for high-surprise/high-growth locations. The only
exception is the Northeast region which sees a trend break. The lack of compensating
decreases in housing and the simultaneous decrease in population at these locations across
all regions supports the interpretation in the main results. It suggests that these communities
become relatively more expensive everywhere. The case of the South Atlantic is somewhat
different. High-surprise/high-growth areas do not experience population decline on impact
– they see a trend break. This implies that population was not significantly affected and
demand for new housing persisted. Uninterrupted population is reflected in the increase in
12I have split region 1 into Northeast and Mid-Atlantic and region 3 into South Atlantic and South Central.
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house prices for this group. This suggests that expected flood risk may not have adjusted
significantly after the flood surprises. Alternatively, it is likely that the high-surprise group
includes locations where risk is already perceived to be high – consistent with the insurance
estimates for South Atlantic in Table ??. Risk awareness in these communities can facilitate
population sorting which can minimize the sensitivity of population and housing values to
risk revisions. This point is discussed in Bunten and Kahn (2014). The authors point out
that incumbents, who have sorted into high-risk locations, may be better at dealing with
disasters and value local amenities highly enough so that risk revisions do not alter the
relative attractiveness of their current location.
Housing depreciates in low pre-growth communities in all regions except for the Midwest
and South Central. The reduction in real estate values paired with the minimal changes in
population is consistent with the interpretation in the main results. Durable housing com-
pensates for the increased risk and leaves population unchanged. In the case of the Midwest
and South Central there are both minimal population changes and no price adjustment. Liv-
ing in these areas effectively becomes more expensive since the real estate does not provide
compensation. The evidence from the FEMA payments in the next section suggests that at
least for the South Central area the incidence of the disaster may be higher on low-wealth
households. This can explain why we do not observe any population effects – these commu-
nities are locked in. In the case of the Midwest region it appears that flood surprises do not
lead to increases in perceived risk but are regarded as rare events.
Overall, the regional results for housing and population are closely matched. They pro-
vide evidence for the interaction between revisions of perceived flood risk and existing de-
mand for new housing which ultimately determine whether more people will inhabit risky
locations.
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6 Extensions and Robustness
Low wealth incidence
The decline in house prices is consistent with turnover in the community whereby higher-
risk tolerant households replace less-risk tolerant ones after a reduction in prices. This leaves
population unchanged but alters the type of people remaining. This is an example of sorting
based on changes in perceived risk. It relies on the assumption that households can finance
their exit from the community by trading their house for a comparable structure somewhere
else. If this is not the case sorting will not take place as people are prevented from leaving.
This is an example of a lock-in effect as in Stein (1995).
I examine the extent to which low wealth can explain the lack of population changes in
low growth areas. I do this by using the FEMA relief payments data. Guidelines from the
agency imply that lower income applicants for disaster relief will be given non-refundable
payments as opposed to loans. A lower-wealth household will be able to pay lower amount
out of pocket and therefore will likely be given a higher non-refundable payment for a given
amount of damage. I test whether flood incidence among low-wealth households is higher
in low growth communities by examining total FEMA payments per damage recorded and
how they differ in low-growth communities. In particular I estimate:
ln(FemaPay)i = βDami + γ1Dami × LSurpi + γ2Dami × LGri + αY + {MulF l}+ i (3)
where FemaPay is total relief payments per capita, Dam is total damages recorded, and αY
is a year effect. The specification estimates the fraction of damages disbursed by FEMA, β,
and allows this to be different for low-surprise events, γ1, and at low growth locations, γ2.
Positive γ2 indicates that FEMA disburses more per given amount of damages in low growth
locations, a result consistent with higher low-wealth incidence of flooding.
Results are shown in Table ??. The national cross-section, (1), reveals that low-growth
locations do receive more non-refundable payments per recorded damage. When I estimate
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the same model allowing for regional heterogeneity we see that floods affect poorer commu-
nities in low growth areas mostly in Northeast and Mid/South Atlantic. Overall, there is
evidence that at least in some parts of the US insufficient wealth can explain the lack of
population change after flood surprises. It suggests that sorting will not necessarily occur
in these parts. It still remains to be seen how real estate values respond in those regions as
well.
Flood Spillovers
Floods can have an effect on other locations that may not themselves be affected. Gallagher
(2014) shows that insurance purchases pick up after floods at locations within the same
media market. To accommodate this, I extend the baseline model in two important ways:
add a set of indicators in Xit that allow the impact, persistence, and trend-break to differ
for places neighboring counties with floods; estimate a set of flood effects for locations that
do not experience a flood but are located in a county where others have floods. The first
case makes sure that the baseline results are not driven by events in neighboring counties i.e.
that being next to a multiple-flood county drives population away not the flood at location.
The second case looks at the possible change in perceived risk that occurs in places that are
close to floods but are not themselves affected. The literature on natural disasters imputes
damages based on wind gradients and hurricane paths. It is likely that some of the locations
do not sustain damages but are assumed to be affected. The results here help us understand
how this influences these estimates.
The evidence is shown in Table ??. Model (1) estimates the baseline results with the
addition of controls for floods occurring in the neighboring counties. We see that the results
are robust to this set of controls. In Model (2) shows that locations that are not affected
directly but are within an affected county experience a decline in population and a trend
break. Note that the spillover effect is smaller than the direct effect. This is consistent
with an increase in perceived risk since the spillover is based on locations without direct
25
damage. Model (3) separates the previous effect depending on whether the nearby floods
were surprises. The results are mixed suggesting that proximity to high surprises being
marginally significant. It is not obvious a-priori if low or high surprise floods will have
different spillover effects for unaffected locations. The evidence suggests that low-surprise
floods have stronger population effects. Models (4)-(6) examine the effect on real estate
values. We see negative spillovers on top- and mid-tier housing. The spillover of a high-
surprise flood has a somewhat stronger effect on prices which is consistent with the weaker
population impact.
Relative Damage vs Flood Indicator
The results in this paper use an indicator for a flood based on a cutoff for minimum relative
damage. I investigate the extent to which actual relative damage affects the main results
regarding population. I introduce variations in damage by replacing the flood indicator with
three indicators for relative damage. These indicators reflect the lower 33th/33th-66th/upper
66th percentile respectively of the distribution of damages at the state level. Specifying the
main population model with them rather than a flood indicator allows us to examine whether
events with relatively higher damage are different from those with relatively lower one. The
results are shown in Table ??. Focusing on the models with controls we can see that all parts
of the damage distribution reduce population for the respective groups that are affected in
the main results. The effect of the upper 66th percentile is slightly lower while the lower 33th
percentile generally has higher effects. These are not statistically different from each other.
Local Social Organizations and Churches
A big literature on resilience after natural disasters emphasizes the importance of local
social capital (Aldrich 2012). Literature on deeper roots of productivity across the US
also emphasizes endowments of social capital (Fulford et al 2018). To accommodate this
I use information from the County Business Patterns dataset which lists the total number
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of establishments at a zip code by 6-digit industry code. I calculate the total number of
civic and social organizations (NAICS 813410) and religious organizations (NAICS 813110)
per capita in each community and define an indicator for locations with above state-median
number. I then include it among the rest of the controls in Xit. The results for population
and real estate are listed in Table ??. The coefficient estimates for the impact of higher level
of social capital are listed at the bottom of the table. The overall results are very similar
to the baseline. Social capital weakens the decline in the pre-flood trend for population and
lowers the decline in the post period for the real estate values. These results are consistent
with the literature on social capital which suggests that communities with higher endowment
will do better after disasters.
Land-use Regulation and Income
The paper emphasizes the importance of pre-flood positive net migration and its interaction
with flood surprises. Here I also explore whether the local housing supply elasticity or the
local income level can explain the observed population patterns. For house elasticity, I use
the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) from Gyourko et al. (2007).
I am able to match a third of the baseline sample with the WRLURI and this limited sample.
Locations with above state-median values for the index are considered to be highly regulated.
For the case of local income, I use the 2000 Census and assign locations based on the state
median income. Results are listed in Table ??. Estimations (2) and (4), which include Xit
controls, show that land regulation and income cannot fully explain the population declines.
Namely, flood surprises reduce population both in locations with high and low regulation.
However, the observed effect in the high-regulated communities is higher, suggesting that a
contraction in the supply of new construction is a part of the reason why population declines.
It is likely that highly-regulated places will reduce the construction of new houses more than
low-regulated ones when flood risk increases. The estimates in (2), therefore, suggest that
some of the observed population decline is due to lower housing supply. The interaction of
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income with flood surprise is also not able to completely explain the population declines –
both high and low income places are affected after a flood.
7 Conclusion
This is the first study that examines the effect of flood surprises using consistent national
data of insured and uninsured damages at the level of the community. It investigates whether
communities respond to surprises in a way consistent with increases in perceived risk. In
particular, I examine how the local population trajectory and real estate values are affected.
I find that risk expectations do not appear to be changed from smaller floods in locations
with previous experience. This indicates that flooding is widely expected and the local
population is already somewhat insulated from the risk with insurance. In places with no
experience flood surprises increases perceived risk. These locations see a combination of
declines in population and house value depreciation. The level of pre-existing demand for
new housing is critical. Attractive communities that are surprised by a flood experience
population declines and no housing depreciation, a combination consistent with newcomers
steering away. Less attractive locations see predominately house price declines and stable
population. Interestingly, the regional results suggests that the Midwest region is the only
area within the country where flood surprises do not lead to increases in flood risk. Using
these results to interpret how climate change will affect communities within the US, we
expect to see three general local outcomes. First, risky locations will not see any changes.
Second, attractive locations where risk increases will experience population declines leading
to stabilizing of population at the pre-flood level. Third, locations where risk increase and
where demand for new housing is low will not see changes in population but will experience
depreciation of housing.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Number of Floods
Floods Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1,771 42.71 42.71
1 1,519 36.63 79.33
2 542 13.07 92.4
3 238 5.74 98.14
4 77 1.86 100
Total 4,147 100
Number of Floods
State 0 1 2 3+
Alabama 41 50 5
Arkansas 20 40 17
California 316 45 1
Colorado 38 23
Connecticut 36 33 7 5
Delaware 4 2
Florida 7 99 34 47
Georgia 99 43 12 3
Illinois 74 74 54 27
Indiana 38 88 6 4
Iowa 6 44 29
Kentucky 22 48 31 6
Louisiana 6 6 20 40
Maryland 29 5
Massachusetts 46 67 21 2
Minnesota 90 23 6 2
Mississippi 8 30 26 23
Missouri 38 48 30
Nevada 13 2
New Hampshire 2 24
New Jersey 12 83 14 77
New York 66 74 19 34
North Carolina 82 51 8 2
North Dakota 4 11
Ohio 89 73 34 6
Oklahoma 25 38 15
Oregon 45 10 2
Pennsylvania 39 82 49 31
Rhode Island 2 12 14
South Carolina 51 15
South Dakota 7 7 1
Tennessee 38 75
Texas 170 65 56
Vermont 3 13 2
Virginia 67 28 6 4
Washington 64 26
West Virginia 20 23 5 2
Wisconsin 58 46 7
Total 1771 1519 542 315
Relative Damage
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
1 0.02% 0.05% 0.14% 0.46% 1.03%
2 0.02% 0.06% 0.19% 0.69% 1.55%
3 0.02% 0.07% 0.25% 0.86% 1.72%
4 0.02% 0.09% 0.34% 1.27% 8.66%
Total Damage ($1 mil)
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
1 0.64 1.67 5.02 16.14 42.39
2 0.64 1.80 5.70 20.75 47.18
3 0.79 2.45 9.14 33.90 76.74
4 0.83 3.42 13.50 69.68 213.80
Average Pop (1,000)
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
0 21 34 62 111 167
1 21 31 57 110 179
2 22 32 55 104 207
3 21 35 60 139 214
4 23 36 77 138 184
Population Growth
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
0 -0.04% 0.55% 1.36% 2.50% 3.44%
1 -0.15% 0.39% 1.14% 2.22% 3.18%
2 -0.24% 0.28% 0.97% 1.97% 2.90%
3 -0.27% 0.21% 0.75% 1.71% 2.51%
4 -0.20% 0.31% 0.96% 2.20% 3.12%
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Surprise and Pre-Flood Growth
Single Flood Single Flood
No Surprise High Surprise Low Surprise Two+
Flood All High Low Low Growth High Growth Low Growth High Growth Floods
Count 1771 1519 934 585 229 705 171 414 857
Relative Damage 0 0.05% 0.04% 0.07% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.06% 0.06%
Total $ Damage (100k) 0 16.67 13.43 24.51 12.91 13.55 18.49 27.36 21.04
Share of Insured Damages 0 14.42% 7.45% 24.83% 3.50% 9.39% 24.57% 25.21% 27.82%
Share of Uninsured FEMA 0 17.44% 20.65% 13.66% 23.67% 19.50% 11.83% 14.29% 13.80%
Share of Uninsured Home SBA 0 2.78% 2.74% 2.87% 4.08% 2.38% 2.04% 3.19% 1.69%
Share of Uninsured Business SBA 0 22.42% 24.77% 19.75% 23.91% 25.48% 16.16% 20.49% 19.42%
Total Structures Lost (1978/2000) 0 0.27% 0.12% 0.83% 0.13% 0.12% 0.93% 0.81% 0.89%
Population (10k) 33.66 31.35 30.38 33.67 25.53 32.84 26.25 38.97 32.73
Median Income (10k) 39.89 38.78 38.23 39.22 33.49 40.56 35.16 41.14 37.54
Population Growth 0.55% 0.39% 0.41% 0.35% -0.31% 0.70% -0.30% 0.65% 0.26%
Fraction of Population in 100 year zone 0.00% 0.08% 0.03% 0.77% 0.00% 0.07% 0.04% 1.51% 1.93%
Insurance Policies 67 120 72 261 54 80 234 271 256
Total $ Coverage (1M) 10.65 15.92 10.48 32.51 7.37 11.76 25.99 35.76 32.54
Top Tier House Value 2.19 1.90 1.88 1.92 1.17 2.12 1.28 2.22 1.80
Middle Tier House Value 1.45 1.25 1.24 1.26 0.73 1.39 0.82 1.44 1.19
Bottom Tier House Value 1.00 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.46 0.93 0.50 1.01 0.77
Table lists median values for the listed variables.
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Table 3: Flood Surprises and Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i ln (Policies)i ln (Policies)i
F 0.450*
(0.230)
F × LSurprise 0.963***
(0.119)
F × Northeast 0.0442
(0.588)
F × Mid-Atlantic 0.706***
(0.228)
F × Midwest -0.0915
(0.216)
F × South Atlantic 1.048**
(0.472)
F × South Central 0.209
(0.358)
F × West -0.438
(0.307)
F × Northeast × LSurp 1.338***
(0.145)
F × Mid-Atlantic × LSurp 0.929***
(0.150)
F × Mid West × LSurp 1.265***
(0.257)
F × South Atlantic × LowSurp 0.624*
(0.339)
F × South Central × LSurp 0.796***
(0.221)
F × West × LSurp 1.668***
(0.185)
F × Dam 0.428*** 0.841***
(0.0886) (0.0978)
F × Dam × LSurprise 0.234*** 0.266***
(0.0276) (0.0370)
F × Dam × Northeast 0.476*** 0.537***
(0.148) (0.0844)
F × Dam × Mid-Atlantic 0.640*** 0.979***
(0.0508) (0.0919)
F × Dam × Midwest 0.396*** 0.420**
(0.0554) (0.170)
F × Dam × South Atlantic 0.355*** 1.045***
(0.115) (0.0730)
F × Dam × South Central 0.448*** 0.447***
(0.0840) (0.0899)
F × Dam × West 0.366*** 0.916***
(0.0597) (0.0845)
F × Dam × Northeast × LSurp 0.266*** 0.310***
(0.0593) (0.0420)
F × Dam × Mid-Atlantic × LSurp 0.153*** 0.176***
(0.00957) (0.0465)
F × Dam × Mid West × LSurp 0.298*** 0.467***
(0.0227) (0.0571)
F × Dam × South Atlantic × LowSurp 0.241*** 0.290***
(0.0428) (0.0439)
F × Dam × South Central × LSurp 0.171*** 0.321**
(0.0594) (0.115)
F × Dam × West × LSurp 0.317*** 0.247**
(0.0438) (0.0915)
Observations 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,443 1,474 1,474
R-squared 0.613 0.620 0.778 0.793 0.867 0.891
Xit Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ln (Payouts)i is log insurance payouts per capita at location i. ln (Policies)i is log of active
insurance policies. F is an indicator for flooding at a single-flood location. Dam is total damage per capita. LSurp is an indicator for
a high history of flooding i.e. low-surprise event. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
Sample covers the period between 2000 and 2016. SE clustered by state.
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Table 4: Flood Surprises and Population Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HSurp: Below State Median Lost Structures HSurp: No Lost Structures
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist
F -0.000840 -0.00918***
(0.00113) (0.00203)
PostF -0.00396*** -0.00934***
(0.00144) (0.00278)
PostTrend -4.08e-05 -0.00404***
(0.000484) (0.000855)
F × HSurp -0.00310** -0.0120*** -0.0173**
(0.00121) (0.00241) (0.00691)
F × LSurp 0.00292 -0.00487** -0.00889***
(0.00193) (0.00234) (0.00203)
PostF × HSurp -0.00462*** -0.0103*** -0.0162*
(0.00174) (0.00312) (0.00941)
PostF × LSurp -0.00259 -0.00758** -0.00916***
(0.00217) (0.00309) (0.00282)
PostTrend × HSurp -0.00148** -0.00582*** -0.00911***
(0.000582) (0.000911) (0.00322)
PostTrend × LSurp 0.00213*** -0.00140 -0.00383***
(0.000615) (0.000931) (0.000848)
F × HSurp × LGr 0.00664*** -0.00305 -0.00703
(0.00115) (0.00243) (0.00454)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.00552*** -0.0141*** -0.0197**
(0.00142) (0.00243) (0.00879)
F × LSurp × LGr 0.0118** 0.00347 0.000248
(0.00537) (0.00505) (0.00257)
F × LSurp × HGr 0.000115 -0.00752*** -0.0113***
(0.00132) (0.00210) (0.00212)
PostF × HSurp× LGr 0.000943 -0.00530 -0.0107*
(0.00190) (0.00333) (0.00625)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.00534*** -0.0113*** -0.0155
(0.00206) (0.00315) (0.0122)
PostF × LSurp× LGr 0.00253 -0.00267 -0.00390
(0.00478) (0.00474) (0.00310)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.00329 -0.00841*** -0.00999***
(0.00213) (0.00318) (0.00289)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr 0.00695*** 0.00222** 0.000915
(0.000597) (0.000894) (0.00213)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00410*** -0.00788*** -0.0130***
(0.000655) (0.000917) (0.00422)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr 0.00891*** 0.00498*** 0.00360***
(0.000874) (0.00104) (0.000842)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.000591 -0.00381*** -0.00609***
(0.000693) (0.000967) (0.000835)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.005 0.023 0.009 0.028 0.039 0.052 0.025 0.05
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year of
impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event.
LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population growth 5 years prior to the event. Estimation (7) and (8) use a different definition for
surprise – zero buildings destroyed between 1978 and 2003. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators
for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter fraction;
below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table 5: Flood Surprises and Real Estate Values
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TopTier MiddleTier BottomTier
F × HSurp × LGr -0.0338*** -0.0230* -0.0204
(0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0162)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.00211 0.00941 0.0175
(0.00900) (0.00916) (0.0117)
F × LSurp × LGr -0.0147 0.00534 0.00815
(0.0138) (0.0129) (0.0167)
F × LSurp × HGr 0.00410 0.0132 0.0170
(0.00944) (0.00943) (0.0120)
PostF × HSurp× LGr -0.0425*** -0.0439** -0.0553***
(0.0153) (0.0174) (0.0204)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.00408 0.00425 0.00116
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0142)
PostF × LSurp× LGr -0.0117 0.00724 -0.0166
(0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0200)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.000138 -0.00135 -0.00581
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0149)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr -0.000319 0.00314 0.00870*
(0.00365) (0.00403) (0.00471)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00526* -0.00270 0.000444
(0.00278) (0.00296) (0.00331)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr -0.00615 -0.00567 0.00167
(0.00402) (0.00416) (0.00450)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.00588** -0.00341 0.000448
(0.00290) (0.00297) (0.00362)
Observations 61,454 60,825 54,459
Within R-squared 0.02 0.023 0.021
Xit Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Top/Middle/BottomTier refers
to the log of the respective house price Zillow index. F is an indicator for
flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year
of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following
the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event.
LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population growth 5 years
prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Addi-
tional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba
damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above me-
dian renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 6: Regional Population Responses
lnPopstist
HighSurprise LowSurprise
VARIABLES LowGrowth HighGrowth LowGrowth HighGrowth
F × Northeast -0.00754** -0.0101*** -0.00669* -0.00998***
(0.00303) (0.00286) (0.00396) (0.00273)
F × Mid-Atlantic -0.00504 -0.0163*** 0.00213 -0.00901*
(0.00540) (0.00488) (0.00376) (0.00463)
F × Midwest 0.00438 -0.0137*** -0.000326 -0.00311
(0.00355) (0.00381) (0.00577) (0.00295)
F × South Atlantic 0.000893 -0.00667 0.00518 -0.00812
(0.00687) (0.00576) (0.00532) (0.00507)
F × South Central -0.00315 -0.0141** 0.0184 -0.00271
(0.00668) (0.00630) (0.0164) (0.00611)
F × West -5.64e-05 -0.0189*** -0.00613 -0.00849
(0.0104) (0.00660) (0.0123) (0.00832)
PostF × Northeast -0.0142*** -0.0175*** -0.0122* -0.0139***
(0.00527) (0.00435) (0.00676) (0.00455)
PostF × Mid-Atlantic -0.00925 -0.0113 -0.00333 -0.0113
(0.00998) (0.00786) (0.00711) (0.00765)
PostF × Midwest 0.000359 -0.0134*** -0.00254 0.000863
(0.00434) (0.00450) (0.00531) (0.00403)
PostF × South Atlantic -0.00438 -0.00197 -0.00829 -0.0164**
(0.00908) (0.00794) (0.00793) (0.00800)
PostF × South Central -0.00242 -0.00915 0.0113 0.00184
(0.00815) (0.00802) (0.0143) (0.00999)
PostF × West 0.00316 -0.0267*** -0.0112 -0.0132
(0.0130) (0.00820) (0.0163) (0.0105)
PostTrend × Northeast 0.00171 -0.000892 0.00366 -0.00297**
(0.00154) (0.00147) (0.00230) (0.00149)
PostTrend × Mid-Atlantic 0.00374 -0.00868*** 0.00531** -0.00171
(0.00290) (0.00268) (0.00252) (0.00256)
PostTrend × Midwest 0.00396*** -0.00714*** 0.00443*** -0.00498***
(0.00117) (0.00157) (0.00129) (0.00133)
PostTrend × South Atlantic 0.000617 -0.0112*** 0.00492* -0.00305
(0.00293) (0.00249) (0.00276) (0.00250)
PostTrend × South Central 0.00477*** -0.00460*** 0.00850*** -0.000660
(0.00183) (0.00176) (0.00277) (0.00263)
PostTrend × West 0.00638* -0.0106*** 0.00903** -0.00701**
(0.00362) (0.00306) (0.00446) (0.00281)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consult notes for Table ?? for details. Sample:
2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc.
of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy;
above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 7: Regional Real Estate Responses for Top Tier Housing
TopTier House Index
HighSurprise LowSurprise
VARIABLES LowGrowth HighGrowth LowGrowth HighGrowth
F × Northeast -0.0404** -0.0296* -0.0280 -0.0381**
(0.0191) (0.0153) (0.0256) (0.0151)
F × Mid-Atlantic 0.00921 0.0203 0.0108 -0.00540
(0.0293) (0.0260) (0.0332) (0.0253)
F × Midwest -0.0196 0.00228 0.00589 0.0163
(0.0222) (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0148)
F × South Atlantic -0.0917*** 0.0378** -0.0200 0.0232
(0.0251) (0.0164) (0.0308) (0.0175)
F × South Central -0.00133 0.00963 0.0132 0.0459**
(0.0228) (0.0193) (0.0245) (0.0218)
F × West -0.159*** -0.00704 -0.120*** -0.0419
(0.0300) (0.0274) (0.0299) (0.0282)
PostF × Northeast -0.0572** -0.0373* -0.0356 -0.0519**
(0.0268) (0.0221) (0.0355) (0.0220)
PostF × Mid-Atlantic -0.0959*** -0.0261 -0.0492 -0.0597*
(0.0370) (0.0333) (0.0414) (0.0323)
PostF × Midwest 0.000684 0.0177 0.0161 0.0361**
(0.0256) (0.0167) (0.0234) (0.0163)
PostF × South Atlantic -0.0428 0.0459* -0.000888 0.0241
(0.0395) (0.0253) (0.0372) (0.0295)
PostF × South Central 0.0134 0.0173 0.0339 0.0424
(0.0296) (0.0240) (0.0359) (0.0266)
PostF × West -0.219*** -0.0265 -0.0863* -0.0806**
(0.0424) (0.0330) (0.0501) (0.0387)
PostTrend × Northeast -0.0154** -0.0126** -0.00827 -0.00917
(0.00642) (0.00568) (0.00969) (0.00604)
PostTrend × Mid-Atlantic 0.0287*** 0.00497 0.0218** 0.0128
(0.00967) (0.00966) (0.00913) (0.00814)
PostTrend × Midwest -0.00199 -0.00443 -0.00780 -0.00386
(0.00522) (0.00420) (0.00493) (0.00430)
PostTrend × South Atlantic -0.0280*** -0.00343 -0.0201* -0.0182**
(0.0101) (0.00815) (0.0117) (0.00780)
PostTrend × South Central 0.00462 -0.00172 -0.00222 0.00628
(0.00758) (0.00576) (0.00760) (0.00599)
PostTrend × West -0.00554 -0.00358 0.00233 -0.0103
(0.0107) (0.00710) (0.0266) (0.00821)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consult notes for Table ??. Sample: 2000/2016.
SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of
fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy;
above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 8: Low-wealth Incidence in Low-Growth Communities
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ln(FemaPay) ln(FemaPay)
F × Dam 0.859***
(0.0141)
F × Dam × LSurp -0.00489
(0.00808)
F × Dam × LGr 0.0307**
(0.0143)
F × Dam × Northeast 0.923***
(0.0285)
F × Dam × Mid-Atlantic 0.816***
(0.0188)
F × Dam × Midwest 0.911***
(0.0154)
F × Dam × South Atlantic 0.816***
(0.0162)
F × Dam × South Central 0.881***
(0.0102)
F × Dam × West 0.821***
(0.0247)
F × Dam × LSurp × Northeast -0.0435
(0.0392)
F × Dam × LSurp × Mid-Atlantic 0.0140
(0.0244)
F × Dam × LSurp × Midwest -0.0116
(0.0143)
F × Dam × LSurp × South Atlantic 0.00162
(0.0143)
F × Dam × LSurp × South Central -0.0158
(0.0130)
F × Dam × LSurp × West -0.0159
(0.0243)
F × Dam × LGr × Northeast 0.0318**
(0.0124)
F × Dam × LGr × Mid-Atlantic 0.0253***
(0.00757)
F × Dam × LGr × Midwest 0.00139
(0.0190)
F × Dam × LGr × South Atlantic -0.00168
(0.0267)
F × Dam × LGr × South Central 0.0359*
(0.0191)
F × Dam × LGr × West -0.109**
(0.0521)
Observations 3,105 3,145
R-squared 0.973 0.971
Xit Controls Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FemaPay refers to total FEMA
relief per capita, Dam refers to total FEMA damage recorded, LSurp is
an indicator for low-surprise event, and LGr is an indicator for low pre-
growth location. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by state. Additional
controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba dam-
age; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median
renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 9: Flood Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist TopHVI MidHVI BotHVI
F × HSurp × LGr -0.00283 -0.00326 -0.00321 -0.0348*** -0.0239* -0.0231
(0.00293) (0.00295) (0.00295) (0.0129) (0.0142) (0.0176)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.0140*** -0.0143*** -0.0143*** -0.00381 0.00761 0.0136
(0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00964) (0.0100) (0.0131)
F × LSurp × LGr 0.00409 0.00371 0.00371 -0.0156 0.00443 0.00556
(0.00476) (0.00477) (0.00477) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0181)
F × LSurp × HGr -0.00685*** -0.00733*** -0.00734*** 0.00403 0.0121 0.0143
(0.00238) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00989) (0.0100) (0.0127)
PostF × HSurp× LGr -0.00668* -0.00716* -0.00708* -0.0346** -0.0327* -0.0455**
(0.00387) (0.00390) (0.00390) (0.0159) (0.0181) (0.0220)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.0134*** -0.0137*** -0.0137*** -0.000572 0.0106 0.00442
(0.00368) (0.00368) (0.00368) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0156)
PostF × LSurp× LGr -0.00357 -0.00404 -0.00397 -0.00518 0.0184 -0.00556
(0.00466) (0.00467) (0.00467) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0212)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.00887*** -0.00943*** -0.00938*** 0.00617 0.00749 0.00155
(0.00344) (0.00345) (0.00345) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0159)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr 0.00212** 0.00224** 0.00229** -0.00338 -0.000543 0.00600
(0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00388) (0.00421) (0.00504)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00784*** -0.00764*** -0.00760*** -0.00696** -0.00511 -0.000937
(0.000961) (0.000970) (0.000969) (0.00298) (0.00312) (0.00354)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr 0.00491*** 0.00509*** 0.00513*** -0.00894** -0.00928** -0.00127
(0.00111) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00431) (0.00437) (0.00481)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.00386*** -0.00367*** -0.00362*** -0.00795** -0.00629** -0.00191
(0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00314) (0.00316) (0.00373)
FNeighbor -0.00975**
(0.00427)
PostFNeighbor -0.00469
(0.00545)
PostTrendNeighbor -0.00375**
(0.00168)
FNeighbor × HSurp -0.00862* -0.0301** -0.0354*** -0.0195
(0.00480) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0165)
FNeighbor × LSurp -0.00936** -0.0250** -0.0282*** -0.0176
(0.00420) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0122)
PostFNeighbor × HSurp -0.00670 -0.0234 -0.0552*** -0.0525***
(0.00602) (0.0182) (0.0158) (0.0182)
PostFNeighbor × LSurp -0.00115 -0.0370*** -0.0614*** -0.0657***
(0.00570) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0165)
PostTrendNeighbor × HSurp -0.00593*** -0.00461 0.00138 0.00425
(0.00180) (0.00451) (0.00398) (0.00460)
PostTrendNeighbor × LSurp -0.00201 -0.00477 -0.00328 0.000537
(0.00183) (0.00369) (0.00357) (0.00407)
Observations 69,927 69,927 69,927 61,378 60,844 54,497
Within R-squared 0.064 0.081 0.083 0.032 0.036 0.034
Neighbor County Flood Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Xit Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period
following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact.
LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population
growth 5 years prior to the event. FNeighbor is an indicator for a community with no flooding located in county
with a single flood only. PostFNeighbor and PostTrendNeighbor are respectively the post- and post-trend for such
a location. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc.
of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter
fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood
communities.
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Table 10: Population Responses with Spline Damage Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist
F × Dam1 -0.000581 -0.00872***
(0.00181) (0.00241)
PostF × Dam1 -0.00343 -0.00833**
(0.00221) (0.00342)
PostTrend × Dam1 0.000144 -0.00371***
(0.000606) (0.000927)
F × Dam2 -0.00191 -0.00995***
(0.00162) (0.00220)
PostF × Dam2 -0.00455* -0.00958***
(0.00238) (0.00296)
PostTrend × Dam2 -0.00104 -0.00473***
(0.000800) (0.000931)
F × Dam3 0.000262 -0.00760***
(0.00134) (0.00229)
PostF × Dam3 -0.00383* -0.00861**
(0.00200) (0.00343)
PostTrend × Dam3 0.000915 -0.00277***
(0.000675) (0.00102)
F × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00441** -0.0130***
(0.00173) (0.00327)
F × LSurp × Dam1 0.00823* 0.00108
(0.00433) (0.00360)
PostF × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00679*** -0.0143***
(0.00249) (0.00482)
PostF × LSurp × Dam1 0.00460 0.00313
(0.00424) (0.00420)
PostTrend × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00118 -0.00498***
(0.000730) (0.00126)
PostTrend × LSurp × Dam1 0.00292*** -0.000330
(0.000887) (0.00116)
F × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00276 -0.0120***
(0.00195) (0.00300)
F × LSurp × Dam2 -0.000601 -0.00753**
(0.00274) (0.00309)
PostF × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00214 -0.0107***
(0.00312) (0.00406)
PostF × LSurp × Dam2 -0.00856** -0.00972**
(0.00350) (0.00399)
PostTrend × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00280*** -0.00678***
(0.00105) (0.00124)
PostTrend × LSurp × Dam2 0.00156 -0.00155
(0.00108) (0.00125)
F × HSurp × Dam3 -0.000564 -0.00982***
(0.00173) (0.00319)
F × LSurp × Dam3 0.00112 -0.00446*
(0.00180) (0.00261)
PostF × HSurp × Dam3 -0.00357 -0.0122**
(0.00258) (0.00479)
PostF × LSurp × Dam3 -0.00420 -0.00315
(0.00278) (0.00399)
PostTrend × HSurp × Dam3 -0.000159 -0.00412***
(0.000863) (0.00139)
PostTrend × LSurp × Dam3 0.00188** -0.00134
(0.000879) (0.00128)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.019 0.041
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Dam1/Dam2/Dam3 are indicators for the lower 33th
percentile/33th-66th percentile/upper 66th of damage within the state. F is an indicator for
flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact. Post-
Trend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is
an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by com-
munity. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba
damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter fraction;
below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for
multiple-flood communities.
(5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist
F × HSurp × LGr ×Dam1 0.00739*** 0.00615***
(0.00151) (0.00215)
F × HSurp × HGr ×Dam1 -0.00683*** -0.0166***
(0.00203) (0.00390)
F × LSurp × LGr ×Dam1 0.0202 0.00558
(0.0129) (0.00827)
F × LSurp × HGr ×Dam1 0.00349* -0.00192
(0.00199) (0.00253)
PostF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam1 -0.00139 0.000660
(0.00268) (0.00441)
PostF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam1 -0.00679** -0.0168***
(0.00291) (0.00586)
PostF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.0111 0.00513
(0.0109) (0.00755)
PostF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam1 0.00243 0.00149
(0.00316) (0.00431)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.00800*** 0.00562***
(0.000880) (0.00115)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr ×Dam1 -0.00368*** -0.00716***
(0.000809) (0.00149)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.00909*** 0.00400***
(0.00167) (0.00149)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr ×Dam1 0.000210 -0.00203
(0.000919) (0.00139)
F × HSurp × LGr ×Dam2 0.00732*** 0.00627**
(0.00180) (0.00279)
F × HSurp × HGr ×Dam2 -0.00545** -0.0159***
(0.00234) (0.00362)
F × LSurp × LGr ×Dam2 0.0126 -0.000747
(0.00971) (0.0100)
F × LSurp × HGr ×Dam2 -0.00372* -0.00930***
(0.00196) (0.00278)
PostF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00361 0.00499
(0.00352) (0.00567)
PostF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00372 -0.0149***
(0.00371) (0.00473)
PostF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00129 -0.00434
(0.00796) (0.00834)
PostF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00985** -0.0107**
(0.00382) (0.00458)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00739*** 0.00514***
(0.000825) (0.00121)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00572*** -0.00926***
(0.00124) (0.00143)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.0103*** 0.00628***
(0.00141) (0.00162)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00115 -0.00364**
(0.00127) (0.00147)
F × HSurp × LGr ×Dam3 0.00429* 0.00324
(0.00236) (0.00324)
F × HSurp × HGr ×Dam3 -0.00279 -0.0130***
(0.00206) (0.00393)
F × LSurp × LGr ×Dam3 0.00315* -0.00757
(0.00187) (0.00627)
F × LSurp × HGr ×Dam3 0.000665 -0.00429
(0.00241) (0.00331)
PostF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.000924 0.00185
(0.00288) (0.00481)
PostF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00578* -0.0167***
(0.00335) (0.00620)
PostF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam3 -0.00569* -0.0103
(0.00331) (0.00657)
PostF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00241 -0.000780
(0.00358) (0.00522)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.00470*** 0.00259**
(0.000762) (0.00122)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00245** -0.00580***
(0.00111) (0.00180)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.00758*** 0.00357**
(0.00107) (0.00158)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.000908 -0.00362**
(0.00102) (0.00164)
Observations 70,403 70,403
R-squared 0.061 0.081
Xit Controls No Yes
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Table 11: Population and Real Estate Responses Controlling for Local Churches and Social
Organizations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist TopTier MiddleTier BottomTier
F -0.0101***
(0.00230)
PostF -0.00948***
(0.00318)
PostTrend -0.00545***
(0.000970)
F × HSurp -0.0128***
(0.00244)
F × LSurp -0.00577**
(0.00287)
PostF × HSurp -0.0103***
(0.00336)
PostF × LSurp -0.00772**
(0.00362)
PostTrend × HSurp -0.00723***
(0.00101)
PostTrend × LSurp -0.00281***
(0.00104)
F × HSurp × LGr -0.00325 -0.0369*** -0.0261* -0.0275*
(0.00244) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0160)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.0141*** -0.00445 0.00703 0.0122
(0.00246) (0.00917) (0.00930) (0.0118)
F × LSurp × LGr 0.00341 -0.0183 0.00181 0.000337
(0.00603) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0169)
F × LSurp × HGr -0.00758*** 0.00145 0.0107 0.0114
(0.00234) (0.00961) (0.00966) (0.0120)
PostF × HSurp× LGr -0.00501 -0.0545*** -0.0569*** -0.0694***
(0.00356) (0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0207)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.0108*** -0.0127 -0.00556 -0.00958
(0.00336) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0144)
PostF × LSurp× LGr -0.00213 -0.0249 -0.00689 -0.0321
(0.00561) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0205)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.00808** -0.00908 -0.0110 -0.0167
(0.00348) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0154)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr 0.00124 0.00144 0.00518 0.00855*
(0.00104) (0.00379) (0.00422) (0.00500)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00858*** -0.00398 -0.00118 0.000514
(0.00100) (0.00281) (0.00299) (0.00339)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr 0.00400*** -0.00438 -0.00366 0.00149
(0.00120) (0.00414) (0.00427) (0.00464)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.00448*** -0.00474 -0.00207 0.000298
(0.00105) (0.00292) (0.00299) (0.00369)
F × Social 0.00222 0.00208 0.000223 0.00560 0.00552 0.0137*
(0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00210) (0.00581) (0.00606) (0.00729)
PostF × Social 0.00109 0.000896 -0.000535 0.0204*** 0.0228*** 0.0271***
(0.00256) (0.00255) (0.00258) (0.00753) (0.00790) (0.00959)
PostTrend × Social 0.00284*** 0.00284*** 0.00150** -0.00265 -0.00318 0.000614
(0.000711) (0.000705) (0.000680) (0.00184) (0.00201) (0.00230)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 61,530 60,920 54,554
Within R-squared 0.025 0.03 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.025
Xit Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period
following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact.
LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Social is an indicator for above median number of social or-
ganizations and churches per capita. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls:
indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local
economy; above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report
the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table 12: Land-use Regulation Index and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist
F × HSurp × L Regulation -0.00162 -0.0101**
-0.00247 -0.00414
F × HSurp × H Regulation -0.00959*** -0.0186***
-0.0031 -0.00481
F × LSurp × L Regulation 0.00228 -0.00976**
-0.00235 -0.00433
F × LSurp × H Regulation 0.000892 -0.00812*
-0.00314 -0.00452
PostF × HSurp× L Regulation -0.00373 -0.00878
-0.00351 -0.00544
PostF × HSurp× H Regulation -0.00837** -0.0142**
-0.0041 -0.00634
PostF × LSurp× L Regulation -0.00414 -0.0128**
-0.00405 -0.00634
PostF × LSurp× H Regulation -0.00674 -0.0132**
-0.00468 -0.00631
PostTrend × HSurp× L Regulation -0.000536 -0.00636***
-0.00126 -0.0018
PostTrend × HSurp× H Regulation -0.00558*** -0.0113***
-0.0015 -0.00237
PostTrend × LSurp× L Regulation 0.00137 -0.00486**
-0.00135 -0.00207
PostTrend × LSurp× H Regulation 0.00249 -0.00227
-0.00159 -0.00208
F × HSurp × L Income -0.000634 -0.00988***
-0.00117 -0.00234
F × HSurp × H Income -0.00679*** -0.0167***
-0.00223 -0.00307
F × LSurp × L Income 0.00485* -0.0039
-0.00288 -0.00284
F × LSurp × H Income 0.000459 -0.00752***
-0.0018 -0.00264
PostF × HSurp× L Income -0.00360** -0.00942***
-0.00176 -0.00307
PostF × HSurp× H Income -0.00597* -0.0126***
-0.00327 -0.00426
PostF × LSurp× L Income -0.000678 -0.00617*
-0.00293 -0.00334
PostF × LSurp× H Income -0.00490* -0.0101**
-0.00295 -0.00406
PostTrend × HSurp× L Income 0.000529 -0.00424***
-0.000611 -0.000901
PostTrend × HSurp× H Income -0.00468*** -0.00919***
-0.000983 -0.00126
PostTrend × LSurp× L Income 0.00294*** -0.00145
-0.000699 -0.000965
PostTrend × LSurp× H Income 0.00101 -0.00235*
-0.000957 -0.00123
Observations 23,747 23,747 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.024 0.063 0.015 0.033
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an
indicator for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend
starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high
surprise event. L Regulation/H Regulation is an indicator for below/above state-median
regulation of the local land use based on the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation
Index. L Income/H Income is an indicator for below/above state-median income from the
2000 Census. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba
damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter fraction;
below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for
multiple-flood communities.
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Figure 1: Locations with Single and Multiple Floods between 2003–2013
Figure 2: Locations with Flood Surprises between 2003–2013
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Figure 3: Population Growth of Milford vs New Haven and Bridgeport
Figure 4: Population and Real Estate Values at Milford vs New Haven and Bridgeport
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Appendix 1: Additional Tables (for online publication
only)
Table A1: Censor at 2bps – Flood Surprises and Population Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist
F -0.00147 -0.00709***
(0.000914) (0.00187)
PostF -0.00385*** -0.00798***
(0.00131) (0.00277)
PostTrend 0.000180 -0.00290***
(0.000489) (0.000875)
F × HSurp -0.00272** -0.00872***
(0.00112) (0.00211)
F × LSurp 0.000434 -0.00486**
(0.00127) (0.00192)
PostF × HSurp -0.00294* -0.00781***
(0.00171) (0.00301)
PostF × LSurp -0.00510*** -0.00832***
(0.00191) (0.00305)
PostTrend × HSurp -0.00144** -0.00448***
(0.000586) (0.000915)
PostTrend × LSurp 0.00242*** -0.000689
(0.000655) (0.000979)
F × HSurp × LGr 0.00669*** 4.92e-05
(0.00123) (0.00212)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.00526*** -0.0111***
(0.00132) (0.00217)
F × LSurp × LGr 0.00720*** 0.00154
(0.00267) (0.00283)
F × LSurp × HGr -0.00143 -0.00674***
(0.00128) (0.00195)
PostF × HSurp× LGr 0.00205 -0.00306
(0.00183) (0.00323)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.00350* -0.00894***
(0.00209) (0.00306)
PostF × LSurp× LGr -0.000959 -0.00447
(0.00278) (0.00342)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.00506** -0.00869***
(0.00240) (0.00335)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr 0.00688*** 0.00350***
(0.000557) (0.000935)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00442*** -0.00681***
(0.000681) (0.000905)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr 0.00876*** 0.00552***
(0.000771) (0.000988)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.000423 -0.00312***
(0.000774) (0.00104)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.007 0.024 0.012 0.029 0.04 0.051
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table replicates the main results in the paper using a higher cut-off
for a flood event. Relative Damage below 2bps is censored. F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator
for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the
impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Estimation (7) and (8) use a different definition for surprise – zero
buildings destroyed between 1978 and 2003. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls:
indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local
economy; above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the
coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table A2: Drop over 8.66% Relative Damage – Flood Surprises and Population Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist lnPopist
F -0.000997 -0.00933***
(0.00112) (0.00202)
PostF -0.00388*** -0.00926***
(0.00144) (0.00277)
PostTrend -8.65e-05 -0.00414***
(0.000483) (0.000853)
F × HSurp -0.00325*** -0.0121***
(0.00120) (0.00241)
F × LSurp 0.00273 -0.00501**
(0.00193) (0.00231)
PostF × HSurp -0.00456*** -0.0103***
(0.00174) (0.00311)
PostF × LSurp -0.00250 -0.00739**
(0.00217) (0.00308)
PostTrend × HSurp -0.00144** -0.00580***
(0.000582) (0.000907)
PostTrend × LSurp 0.00196*** -0.00167*
(0.000617) (0.000934)
F × HSurp × LGr 0.00649*** -0.00319
(0.00115) (0.00245)
F × HSurp × HGr -0.00567*** -0.0143***
(0.00142) (0.00243)
F × LSurp × LGr 0.0117** 0.00327
(0.00543) (0.00505)
F × LSurp × HGr -6.37e-05 -0.00767***
(0.00131) (0.00209)
PostF × HSurp× LGr 0.000959 -0.00539
(0.00190) (0.00332)
PostF × HSurp× HGr -0.00526** -0.0113***
(0.00206) (0.00314)
PostF × LSurp× LGr 0.00253 -0.00279
(0.00484) (0.00474)
PostF × LSurp× HGr -0.00312 -0.00818***
(0.00211) (0.00317)
PostTrend × HSurp× LGr 0.00697*** 0.00223**
(0.000594) (0.000889)
PostTrend × HSurp× HGr -0.00405*** -0.00785***
(0.000655) (0.000914)
PostTrend × LSurp× LGr 0.00893*** 0.00488***
(0.000883) (0.00105)
PostTrend × LSurp× HGr -0.000818 -0.00413***
(0.000694) (0.000969)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.003 0.024 0.007 0.029 0.042 0.056
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table replicates the main results in the paper by dropping communities
with more than 8.66% relative damage. For additional details see Table ??
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Appendix 2: Data Construction (for online publication
only)
NFIP maintains an official record of the number of policies sold, total coverage, and total
payouts at the level of a given community since the program effectively partners with the local
authority enforcing the flood map and building code. The geographical level is consistent
with the US Census definition of general-purpose government units such as cities, towns,
townships, as well as the remaining county areas (county balance). I focus on 38 states with
FEMA disaster declarations related to flooding. Table ?? lists the states considered. Median
population across the 4,147 communities in 38 states in the sample is 34 thousand people.
Insurance information includes homeowners and business structures.
NFIP does not list payouts associated with particular flood events. Instead, it shows
up-to-date payouts starting from 1978. I use historical observations of the official record
taken approximately twice a year between 2003 and 2014 to calculate the amount of new
payouts claimed at each community. These represent insured damages associated with flood
events during each year. I carefully link the observed payouts to the set of FEMA disaster
declarations for each state. The matching was not automated but involved reading the
description of FEMA declarations for each state/year and associating flood events in the
covered counties to observed insurance payouts at communities in those counties. This link
allows me to identify both the amount of insured and uninsured damages for each FEMA
event. In approximately 25% of community/year cases total losses are based only on insured
damage. This is consistent with the fact that not all communities in counties with disaster
declarations will have significant uninsured losses.
The uninsured damages are sourced from FEMA’s individual/public assistance data and
from Small Business Administration’s (SBA) individual/business lending data. A disaster
declaration makes federal funding available to affected individuals without insurance. They
can receive either a direct non-refundable payment or a highly subsidized loan depending
on their ability to take on additional credit. FEMA administers the direct payments and
SBA extends the loans. Both maintain a registry that identifies the amount of assistance
provided and the related total damage at the zip-code level for each disaster declaration.
Altogether, total damage in the data has four components: insured individual/business from
NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured
public from FEMA. In this paper I focus primarily on total damage. The components are
only used to control for events where most of the damage comes from one of the source.
Relative damage is calculated using an estimate for the total value of the real estate
during the year of a flood. The value is calculated using information from the 2000 Census
at the block level. I add the total housing values listed in the Census across all of the value
categories for a total real estate value in 2000. I then use the annual state house values from
the FHFA to project the 2000 values forward for each year.
Zip-code data is associated to community-level data using block-level population weights.
In particular each Census block lists the total population, the zip-code, and the community.
This allows me to assign zip-code values to communities by appropriately weighting using
population.
Data on flood insurance policies is only available for the years of 2002-2006 and 2010.
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This is due to a change in the way data was reported across the years.
Fraction of population in a flood zone has been calculated by overlaying community flood
zones with census blocks from the 2000 Census. I have used area as weights to assign the
2000 population from each block in or outside of the flood zone.
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